ประชาสังคมกับการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางการเมืองในอินโดนีเซีย: จากอิสานานิยมสู่ประชาธิปไตย

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บทคัดย่อ

รูปการสำคัญที่สุดประการหนึ่งของยุคการปฏิรูปคือการเติบโตของขบวนการประชาสังคม ความสนใจที่เพิ่มขึ้นของความคิดเกี่ยวกับประชาสังคมในอินโดนีเซีย ก่อให้ขึ้นจากการตอบสนองต่อการกระทำทางการเมืองในยุคระเบียบใหม่ ดังที่แอนเดอร์สันเสนอว่าระเบียบใหม่ถูกรับรู้เป็นการตอบสนองต่อการตอบสนองของรัฐและชัยชนะของรัฐต่อสังคมและชาติ คุณลักษณะของยุคระเบียบใหม่ ก็คือการที่รัฐครอบงำสังคม ความเข้าใจร่วมกันของชาวอินโดนีเซียในเรื่องโครงสร้างทางการเมืองในอินโดนีเซียถูกครอบงำโดยรัฐ ด้วยมุมมองของทฤษฎีโครงสร้างของกรัมชี ซึ่งนำเสนอกระบวนการเกี่ยวกับโครงสร้างส่วนบนในแนวคิดว่าด้วยอำนาจที่ถือได้ว่าเหมาะสมกับสถานการณ์ของอินโดนีเซียในยุคระเบียบใหม่ บทความนี้ใช้วิธีการศึกษาเชิงคุณภาพ
และค้นคว้าเอกสารได้แก่หนังสือและวารสารที่มีรายชื่อเกี่ยวกับหัวข้อที่ศึกษาตลอดจนเอกสารประกอบการสัมภาษณ์ด้วย โดยเน้นศึกษาวิเคราะห์ในส่วนของประวัติศาสตร์และสังคมวิทยาของขบวนการประชาสังคมกับการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางการเมืองในอินโดนีเซีย ทั้งนี้การเปลี่ยนแปลงดังกล่าวเป็นผลสืบเนื่องมาจากการเกิดขึ้นของประชาสังคมในอินโดนีเซีย โดยขบวนการดังกล่าวเป็นผลสืบเนื่องจากหลายปัจจัย เช่นลัทธิอานาจนิยมยุคการปฏิรูป ประชาธิปไตย, ประชาสังคม, ระเบียบใหม่, ลัทธิอานาจนิยม, ยุคการปฏิรูป

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Civil Society and the Political Change in Indonesia: From Authoritarian to Democracy

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Abstract

One of the most important aspects of the Reformation Era is the rise of civil society movements. Increasing attention to the idea of civil society in Indonesia emerged as a reaction to the political discourse the New Order Era. Anderson argues that the New Order is well understood as the reaction of the state and its triumph vis-a-vis society and nation. One of the major characteristics of the New Order Era was the dominance of the state over society. A common wisdom among most Indonesians is that political life in Indonesia is strongly dominated by the state. Based on the structural theory of Gramsci that representing the supra-structure paradigm based on the concept of hegemony, and it is suitable with the situation in Indonesia during the New Order Era. This writing is qualitative research and using library research. The sources are books and journals on similar research topics, and conference papers. The
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study analyses the historical and sociological aspects of civil society and political change in Indonesia. In fact, the change was caused by the emergence of civil society movement in Indonesia. The movement were caused several factors, such as the authoritarianism of the New Order Era, corruption, the Armed forces of Indonesia.

**Keywords:** authoritarianism, civil society, corruption, democracy, new order, Reformation Era.
1. Introduction

The development of state and civil society relation from authoritarian New Order Era to democracy of Reformation Era is a reflection of Anthony Giddens’s theory, concerning dialectic of control, where the relation between state and civil society is relatively equal.¹ The hegemony of state and civil society in New Order Era is the consequence of authoritarian New Order government. This situation is change during the post-Suharto Indonesia.

The evaluation of democracy in Indonesia has generally been based on the analysis of domestic political conditions, but the present era of globalization has brought new ideas and political attitudes. During the period of 1989-1999 Suharto and other political leaders embraced the idea of keterbukaan or “openness”, relaxing restrictions on demonstrations and censorship of the press. The period saw various controversial topics such as human rights abuses move into public discourse. Despite criticism from dissidents that this was a sham, the regime's efforts were genuine. Even the Armed Forces confined themselves to a non-partisan role during the 1992 election campaign and public debates were allowed concerning the limitation of presidential incumbency and the national leadership succession.²

The period of openness came to an end in 1994 when Suharto sensed the danger in offering greater political freedoms to the populace. Attempts to reassert state authority through a combination of the carrot

and the stick in subsequent years only provided more incentive for the expansion of public discourse and the development of civil society organizations.\(^3\)

To bring idea into focus, I will discuss about the condition of civil society during the New Order structure, and Reformation Era and its impact on civil society.

### The New Order Structure vs. Civil society

The most important element in the rise of civil society movements in Indonesia was the authoritarianism of the New Order era. The 'New Order' refers to the period of Suharto’s rule. It dated from 1966, following the decimation of the Communist Party of Indonesia and the collapse of Sukarno’s government in 1965. The transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto effectively ended the role of political parties and associated mass organisations, and gave the state absolute power over society.

In operating its administration, the New Order regime chose intellectuals and technocrats as power partners, a strategy which strengthened its main political body, the Golkar or “Functional Grouping”. The New Order’s first move was away from Sukarno’s populism towards corporatism, which entailed the linking of social institutions and organisations into the state apparatus.\(^4\)

President Suharto and his New Order regime were very successful at doing this during more than three decades in power. According to

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Eklof, up to mid-1997 the regime was successful in economic growth, which brought about increased standards of living for the majority of the Indonesian people. However it also brought its fair share of traumatic social change. The regime continued to rely on its ruling formula of combining authoritarian controls with a degree of popular legitimacy mainly derived from the economic benefits flowing to the majority of Indonesians.\(^5\)

The New Order saw a restructuring of the political system in which the independence and influence of the political parties was severely circumscribed. Several of the parties experienced pressure and manipulation from the government in their internal affairs, and those parties that were not banned after the 1971 election were pressed to merge to form two non-government parties. As a result, four Muslim parties merged to form the United Development Party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and three nationalist and two Christian parties merged to form the Indonesian Democratic Party, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI). Both parties had to adhere to the state ideology Pancasila, and were designed to be purely nominal opposition parties.\(^6\)

Besides this political representation, the government attempted to organise the rest of society in functional groups in order to be able to control the social and political aspirations of the people. The public sphere was not be an autonomous space in which individuals could freely associate. The government also tried to monopolise the representation of major interest groups, such as workers, students, women and religious congregations, through its control over their


\(^6\) Ibid., p. 5-6.
respective interest organisations. Groups such as Korpri and Kadin were mentioned in the introduction as examples of this. The government initiated the formation of new organisations and sponsored those already existing, providing them with official recognition and funding. In exchange, the organisations were obliged to channel the government's policies and political aspirations to their members, and to give electoral support to Golkar.  

In terms of political economy, the government controlled the parcelling out of economic favours. A huge number of petrol stations or oil distribution services, for instance, were provided by the government. This enabled it to build up a political economy where economic rewards were exchanged for political loyalty. Indonesia's economic rehabilitation thus served to stymie civil society. The recovery was worked out through foreign aid and investment, and through the oil boom of the earlier 1970s. The negative consequence of the economic miracle was that the central government gained control over most of the requisite funds. It could then patronise organisations which made up New Order 'civil society' and ignore those which were viewed as unwanted or anti-state.  

The rapid economic recovery of post-Sukarno Indonesia was thus achieved through trade-off between economic development and civil rights. This factor should not however obscure the achievements of Suharto in bringing a degree of prosperity to the nation. Hainsworth states that Suharto had good reason to be proud of Indonesia’s achievements during the 30 years of his New Order administration, 

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7 Ibid., p. 7
8 Ibid.
particularly in comparison to the preceding 16 (1944-1965) years of political and economic chaos under Sukarno. There were several economic achievements under the New Order era. Population growth rates fell from 2.2 per cent in 1970 to 1.7 per cent in 1995 with the average real GDP growth rising above 6 per cent per annum in the same period. The percentage of population living below the poverty line was officially estimated to have declined from around 40 per cent in 1971 to a forecasted 11 per cent in 1997. Additionally there were improvements in a range of social indicators, such as a rise in literacy from around 20 per cent in 1960 to 84 per cent in 1997, and a drop in infant mortality from around 225 to 55 per 1,000. Virtual self-sufficiency in rice was achieved by the 1980s after being the world’s largest importer of rice in the early 1960s. Finally, structural transformation involved the share of agriculture in the GDP decreasing from 45 per cent in 1970 to 18 per cent in 1995, with the share of industry and manufacturing rising from 29 per cent to 61 per cent during the same period.¹⁰

¹⁰Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting Indonesia in the 1990s, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1994, p. 50. Generally, Indonesia’s economy had performed well since Suharto's ascendancy to power. The management of monetary resources encouraged investment and increased labour productivity. When combined with an oil boom this gave Indonesia an average rate of growth of more than 7 per cent from 1968 to 1981. However, annual growth decreased to 4.3 per cent between 1981 and 1988 due to the fall-off in oil revenues and the accumulated effect of government intervention. From 1989 to 1993 the economy again increased to almost 7 per cent annually.

However, all scholars agree that at the end of Suharto’s government, the economic conditions in Indonesia dropped sharply. Corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) were some of the primary causes of the economic crisis which struck Indonesia in 1997. Even by the end of the 1980s, corruption and collusion had increased and thrived in this political economy. A huge amount of resentment became focused on President Suharto's blatant favouritism of his own relatives and his cronies. Beginning in the 1980s, several of Suharto’s children began assembling vast conglomerates from the concessions handed to them from the president. Anger towards such crony capitalism was one reason for the growth of civil society because it was seen as one possible way of voicing collective dissatisfaction with such corrupt practices.

Another important point in regard to the rise of civil society was the role of the Armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) in the New Order era. One of the major concerns in the New Order era was the role of the ABRI in the formulation and enforcement of the de-politicization strategy outlined above. According to Ramage the “ABRI as an institution is deeply imbued with a comprehensive ideological notion of itself and of the nation. That is, Indonesia as a

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Eklof explains that Suharto’s children were active in a wide range of economic fields. For example, Suharto’s eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, held interests in telecommunications, agribusiness, road toll contraction and ship manufacturing. Suharto’s second son, Bambang Triharmojo controlled the large Bimantara group, which was active in telecommunications, real estate, agribusiness, food retailing, construction and electronics. Meanwhile, Suharto’s youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putra (Tommy) had interests in shipping, agribusiness, petrochemicals and air travel. Indeed, in 1996 a presidential decree gave Tommy’s company, P.T. Timor Putra National, the task of developing a national car. Ibid.,
Pancasila State is often defined by ABRI ideology.\textsuperscript{12} Any threat to the Pancasila (which political Islam was construed as representing) was dealt with firmly. The Tanjung Priok massacre of 1984 provided one of the most glaring instances of such ABRI suspicions of political Islam. When a 'petition of 50' was released to demand a government investigation into the affair, A.M. Fatwa, a prominent Muslim opposition politician, was detained by ABRI on suspicions of being behind the petition.\textsuperscript{13} In 1985, A.M. Fatwa was condemned by a court of first instance in Jakarta and sentenced to 18 years in jail.\textsuperscript{14}

According to Suryadinata, after the transferral of power from Sukarno to Suharto in March 1966, ABRI held a seminar to decide upon the social-economic and political role of the military in Indonesia. It was decided that the dual function (dwi fungsi) of ABRI should become a feature of Indonesian political life.\textsuperscript{15} In 1969 the territory of Indonesia was divided into six regional commands in which each of the four services were integrated.\textsuperscript{16} Rigid control by the military elite over the activities of the local military commanders and civilian administration was then established. As a result, the growing influence of the enemies of the military elite among the lower ranks could be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Douglas E Ramage, "Pancasila Discourse in Suharto’s Late New Order." In Democracy in Indonesia 1950s and 1990s, ed. David Bourchier and John Legge, Clayton: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, p. 163
\item \textsuperscript{13} A group of Indonesian 'dissidents', which consisted of 50 members. They were always opposite to the government of New Order.
\item \textsuperscript{14} A.M. Fatwa, “Saya Tidak Sentimen kepada Pak Harto,” Jakarta Magazine, No 373, August 28 – September 3, 1993, p. 26
\item \textsuperscript{16} The police were separated from ABRI in 1998.
\end{itemize}
curbed more effectively.\textsuperscript{17} However such surveillance could be extended to the general populace and perceived enemies of the state. Such surveillance is obviously inimical to the notion of an autonomous public space. The participation of ABRI in a revised national discourse was one of the important factors in the rise of civil society towards the end of New Order era. Prior to this revision however, ABRI was the primary means of stifling the emergence of any effective civil society in Indonesia.

In Ramage’s opinion, there are several reasons why ABRI participates in national discourse. Firstly, participation of ABRI in the integral discourse of Pancasila is a key factor in maintaining its ideological legitimacy. Integral is a military supported concept with roots in the Independence Investigating Committee debates of 1945 and is a significant component of the ABRI perspective.\textsuperscript{18} Pancasila as an integrated ideology usually indicates a commitment to a concept of the state and society as an organic totality, which is not viewed in terms of individual rights, but in terms of social obligation. ABRI's obligation was not only in defending, but discursively defining the boundaries of permissible political behaviour in the Pancasila State.\textsuperscript{19} Senior ABRI leaders have always dominated public discourse on the Pancasila. For example, the former Defence Minister Moerdani vowed to crush any attempts to replace the Pancasila state ideology with religious or ethnic ideologies both from Islam and Communism. Former


\textsuperscript{18} It is also the same concept underlying GOLKAR.

\textsuperscript{19} Douglas E. Ramage, op. cit ., p. 164
Army Chief of Staff General Sudrajat and former social and Political Affairs chief Lt. Gen. Harsudiono Hartas both identified proponents of liberal democracy, western human rights and 'fundamental' Islam as threats to Pancasila and national unity. Hartas perceived ICMI as one such manifestation of an anti-Pancasila threat to the state.  

Civil society movements in Indonesia arose in opposition to the authoritarianism of the New Order and the domination of the ABRI over civil society. The continual abuses of coercive power in incidents such as Tanjung Priok, Palembang and Aceh undermined the legitimacy of ABRI in the eyes of the people. An increasingly self-conscious 'Muslim' faction within ABRI itself also opened up the institution to a bit of introspection.

There has been a tradition of parliamentary party politics in Indonesia, but for over thirty years it had been emasculated, first by Sukarno's Guided Democracy and then by the New Order's almost obsessive concerns for order. The Indonesian Parliament (DPR) became a little more than a cosmetic component of the New Order's all embracing concept of Pancasila Democracy. It was elected once every five years, but with no power to table legislation, only the duty to pass executive decisions.

In contrast to Sukarno's 'politics as commander' dogma, economic development under the New Order took precedence over political development. Sukarno's preference for revolutionary action over economic stability affected contemporary perceptions of the earlier

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20 Ibid.
period of Constitutional Democracy in the 1950s. Despite twenty-five years of political sterility, many intellectuals continued to view the Constitutional Democracy period as one of interminable political chaos.\(^{22}\)

This affected their views of the political parties and their role in civil society. Whilst liberal democracy allowed the flourishing of civil society, a lack of constraints led to a chaotic situation which compromised the integrity of the state itself amongst other things. Again, the Hegelian fear of the 'anarchy' that an unfettered civil society could produce was evident in these concerns. The 'order' of the Suharto was seen as a necessary evil in many respects by intellectual elites. The 'shutting down' of civil society was accomplished by various means.

The first step came when Suharto was elected as full president by the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) in 1968. The price was the increasing domination of the military politics.\(^{23}\)

The second phase was related to the quest of legitimacy for President Suharto. The upper house or MPRS\(^{24}\) decided that the government should hold elections in 1968. After fierce public debates on an election bill, particularly in relation to the establishment of a district or proportional system, the government finally chose a proportional system modified to limit the number of parties and to allow parties to propose candidates for parliament who represented the regions. The government then decided to turn the functional groups organisation

\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 237

\(^{23}\)Ichlasul Amal, “The Dilemmas of Decentralisation and Democratisation.” In David Bourchier and John Legge, op.cit. p. 216

\(^{24}\)MPRS (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Smentara) is Provisional People’s Consultative Council. This council was implemented in Indonesia in 1965, which headed by M. Natsir.
Golkar into a government party. Golkar was backed-up by two essential elements of the New Government, the military and government bureaucracy. It achieved a landslide victory winning with 62.8 percent of the votes in 1971. This victory not only enhanced President Suharto's legitimacy but it had also involved civil servants directly in politics.\(^\text{25}\)

Following the 1971 election the role of political parties was curtailed even further by the government. It designed a 'floating mass' system as a way of diverting attempts at democratisation. The idea of a 'floating mass' ensured that the hierarchical command of the New Order government would reach into the village through Golkar (technically not a political party), and affiliated institutions such as the bureaucracy and the military. Political party activity (PPP, PDI) was restricted to the district level, giving them no access to the people at sub-district and village level.\(^\text{26}\) However, the government remained committed to a democratic veneer by which it could legitimate its dominant position. The elections of 1977, 1982, and 1987 were intended to preserve this democratic fiction and the results were in most respects similar to the election of 1971.\(^\text{27}\)

The evaluation of democracy in Indonesia has generally been based on the analysis of domestic political conditions, but the present era of globalisation has brought new ideas and political attitudes. During the period of 1989-1999 Suharto and other political leaders embraced the idea of keterbukaan or “openness”, relaxing restrictions

\(^{25}\) Ibid.
\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 218
on demonstrations and censorship of the press. The period saw various controversial topics such as human rights abuses move into public discourse and dissidents such as A.M. Fatwa were released from prison. ICMI was one body which took up this topic as will be discussed later. Despite criticism from dissidents that this was a sham, Amal argues that the regime's efforts were genuine. Even the Armed Forces confined themselves to a non-partisan role during the 1992 election campaign and public debates were allowed concerning the limitation of presidential incumbency and the national leadership succession.\(^\text{28}\)

The period of openness came to an end in 1994 when Suharto sensed the danger in offering greater political freedoms to the populace. However the cat had been let out of the bag. Attempts to reassert state authority through a combination of the carrot and the stick in subsequent years only provided more incentive for the expansion of public discourse and the development of civil society organisations.

### Reformation and Its Impact on civil society

The diverse groups that coalesced into the reform movement under the New Order played an important role in the post-Suharto political order. However, their diversity is more a weakness rather than strength. After three decades of forced de-politicization, no organised alternative to the ruling party existed in 1997. These groups shared no national agenda other than a desire to see Suharto leave office, to eradicate corruption and to reform the laws that have crippled political organisation. Again, an important cleavage was that between modernist and traditionalist streams of Islam. The two most important

\(^{28}\text{Ibid., p. 220}\)
figures in these two camps were Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid.

Amien Rais fell out with the group due to its relation to the Suharto regime and went on to become a leading figure in the anti-Suharto reform movement. Likewise, Abdurrahman Wahid, a former chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama, dissented from the New Order, though in a less confrontational manner. Rais, the outspoken leader of the mainly urban Muslim organisation Muhammadiyah, was the key in drawing Muslim support for the pro-democracy movement in 1998. However, possibly more significant was Wahid's mid-May call for a speedy, peaceful presidential succession. Some leaders within the NU, a nationwide organisation that draws its strength from high-profile clerics and rural Islamic boarding schools, have been close to the ruling Golkar party. Their decision to reserve this attitude came from its grassroots, with regional NU branches making a strong pitch for change. Islamic clamour also rose from the Islamic Students’ Association, an organisation with a history of activism and strong ties to the elite. Groups with more militant reputations, such as Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah, the World for Muslim Solidarity, also raised their voice. The reaction to the major crisis showed a split in Islamic reformist groups.

On the 19th of May 1998, Suharto announced that there would be new presidential elections that he would not run. NU Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid at that time, wheelchair-bound after stroke, appeared alongside Suharto, and said afterward that the demonstrations should cease. Rais’s reaction could not have provided a bigger

contrast. Accusing the president of stalling, he reiterated his call for one million faithful to take to the streets the following day. Even in the week leading up to Suharto’s announcement, the growing opposition was evident. Three distinct pro-democracy bodies sprang up in Jakarta; the ‘People’s Council’, the ‘Indonesian Working Forum’, and the ‘National Reform Movement Presidium’. Moreover, intellectuals, community activists, former government officials and retired military personnel embraced these groups. However, the launching of the 50-plus-member Peoples’ Council (petisi 50), which is grouped around Rais, was marred by disclaimers from some who said they had not actually signed on.30

The confusion within NU during Wahid’s absence and the internal opposition to his erratic tendencies had contributed to Nahdlatul Ulama’s passivity during the final weeks of Suharto’s rule. However, it is unlikely that NU would have taken a different stand had it been more solid. Since the beginning of the crisis, NU’s policy had been continued commitment to Suharto and the military, and it was possible that only Wahid’s sickness prevented him from further damaging his reputation within the pro-democracy movement. On May 15, the day of Suharto’s return, NU Headquarters issued a statement welcoming the president’s preparedness to step down, even though at that stage the matter had already been clarified by Minister by Ali Alatas. A few days earlier Said Agil, an NU spokesman, had announced that NU was preparing its own proposals for political reform, but at that time

30 Ibid.
the demand for Suharto’s resignation was not yet mentioned.31

In his last days as president, Suharto attempted to reactivate NU’s loyalty towards his regime. Suharto was aware that NU disliked both Rais and the prospect of a Habibie presidency. On May 19, Suharto asked a number of Muslim leaders to come to the palace, including Abdurrahman Wahid, Ahma Bagdja, Ma’ruf Amin, Ali Yafie and Ilyas Ruchiat from NU, and only two from the Muhammadiyah. Suharto had arranged the meeting after consultation with the prominent NU intellectual Nurcholis Madjid on the previous evening. Suharto agreed with Madjid that he would step down as soon as possible after general elections were held. During the meeting, Madjid emphasised that reform meant nothing else than Suharto’s immediate resignation. Hearing this, Wahid was surprised that Madjid wanted the president’s dismissal. Even though none of the participants agreed to join the reform committee outlined by Suharto, Wahid later told the press that he believed Suharto’s plan was the best solution that the country could expect.32

It seemed that Suharto’s attempt to split the Muslim community along the lines of their traditional rivalries had succeeded, although too late. On the following day, the leaders of parliament and key figures of his cabinet deserted him. The efforts to convince opposition leaders to sit in the reform committee proposed by Suharto failed. In the evening of Wednesday May 20, Suharto decided to hand over his mandate to Vice President B.J. Habibie.

32 bid., p. 194
Conclusion

Based on the explanation above, it is clear that civil society and the political condition in Indonesia is change from authoritarianism of the New Order Era to democratic condition of Reformation Era. The change was caused by the emergence of civil society movement in Indonesia. The most important element in the rise of civil society movements in Indonesia was the authoritarianism of the New Order Era (1966-1997). The regime was successful in economic growth, which brought about increased standards of living for the majority of the Indonesian people. However it also brought its fair share of traumatic social change. The New Order saw a restructuring of the political system in which the independence and influence of the political parties was severely circumscribed. The government was also attempted to organise the rest of society in functional groups in order to be able to control the social and political aspirations of the people. The public sphere was not be an autonomous space in which individuals could freely associate. The second important aspect of the rise of civil society in Indonesia at the end of Suharto’s government was the economic conditions that was dropped sharply. Corruption, collusion and nepotism were some of the primary causes of the economic crisis which struck Indonesia in 1997. The third important aspect that increase the civil society movement in Indonesia was the role of the Armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia in the New Order era. Civil society movements in Indonesia arose in opposition to the authoritarianism of the New Order and the domination of the Armed forced over civil society. Onother important aspect for the rise of civil
society movement in Indonesia was Islam. The government of Suharto was long concerned with the latent political power of Islam. Therefore the government produced many policies that harmed Islamic interests. As a result, the 1980s were characterised by Muslims as a period of “Islam phobia” where even Muslims were afraid to be too overtly 'Islamic'. However, during the period of 1989-1999 Suharto and other political leaders embraced the idea of keterbukaan or “openness”, relaxing restrictions on demonstrations and censorship of the press. In 1997, the economic crisis in Indonesia caused the rise civil society movement as the accumulation of autoritarism of New Order era, corruption, armed domination, and Islam phobia.

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